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Abstract: The paper presents a concrete application of the Safe Mediation Space methodology. The
engagement of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (Switzerland) and its partner, the Cordoba
Peace Institute was based on the analysis that tensions between so called “Islamists” and “Secularists”
are obstacles to inclusive and peaceful societies in the North African region. At the intersection of religion
and politics, the status, role and condition of women is seen an incubator of tensions in society. These
tensions have two direct consequences: they represent an obstacle to the advancement of women’s status
and condition and further hinder the constructive cooperation between actors with different references.
The specific conflict transformation methodology helped to bring people together representing influential
currents for a dialogue that would enable them to engage jointly in concrete initiatives for the benefit of
addressing women’s issues.
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1. Introduction  
The Constitution of Switzerland declares that the Confederation shall 
“[…] promote respect for human rights and democracy, the peaceful co-
existence of peoples as well as the conservation of natural resources.”1 
Within this context, the Human Security Division of the Federal 
Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) has created a program working 
on peace promotion with religiously motivated political actors. As part 
of the Swiss political culture,2 Switzerland has developed mechanisms to 
constructively address conflicts between religious communities 
throughout its history. 
Since the uprisings in 2011, the FDFA and its partner, Cordoba Peace 
Institute – Geneva (CPI), have worked in several contexts in North 
Africa and the Middle East to alleviate tensions that had arisen from 
worldview differences. This engagement is based on the analysis that 
tensions between so called “Islamists” and “Secularists” are obstacles to 
inclusive and peaceful societies in the region. In this paper, the 
simplifying terms “Islamists” and “Secularists”i are used with regard to 
the worldview references used by the actors themselves to describe their 
political aspirations and demands. This terminology does not point to 
their religious identity or faith. 
Based on that analysis and at the request of local actors, the FDFA 
and CPI organized and facilitated a dialogue process in Morocco from 
2015 to 2017. This project was formulated based on the observation that 
at the intersection of religion and politics, the status, role and condition 
of women is an incubator of tensions in society. These tensions have 
two direct consequences: they represent an obstacle to the advancement 
of women’s status and condition and further hinder the constructive 
cooperation between actors with different references. 
The objectives of the dialogue process were: 1) to bring together 
actors of different references concerned with women's issues in 
Morocco in order to reduce the obstacles arising from the polarization 
between secularists and Islamists in Morocco and 2) to identify and work 
on concrete initiatives in order to improve the status of women in 
Morocco. 
 
i Due to the lack of better words the term “secularists” is used to describe those who refer to 
secular institutional frameworks, such as CEDAW for their political aspirations. This does not 
refer to their faith, nor to the French process of localization of the religious in the private sphere. 
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The methodology used was the “Safe Mediation Space” (SMS) with 
the aim of bringing together people representing influential currents 
present in Moroccan society for a non-ideological dialogue that would 
enable them to engage jointly in concrete initiatives for the benefit of 
addressing women's issues. 
The aim of this paper is to present a concrete application of the SMS 
methodology, as very few concrete cases have been documented so far. 
As the methodology has been described in the literature, the main focus 
here is on reflection of the process itself.  
The paper3 is structured into four sections: The first section gives a 
historical background of the issues at stake. In the second section, a brief 
overview of the theoretical background of the SMS methodology is 
presented. Conflicts with religious incompatibilities are provably more 
difficult to solve than other conflicts and the SMS is one methodology 
that can help to transform such conflicts. The third section of the paper 
illustrates a few elements of the conflict analysis, criteria for 
participation, the definition of the “ground rules”, the formulation of the 
common vision and the “safety lines”, negotiated intensively with the 
interlocutors, as well as the negotiated results of the implementation of 
the SMS. The fourth section of the paper presents a reflection on the 
lessons learnt and open questions. 
2. Historical background 
« Rabat, Casablanca…une marche féministe, une contre-marche 
sexiste, une action, une réaction... Inévitablement, une bataille de chiffres. 
Inévitablement, une bataille médiatique. Indices d’une bataille politique 
dans laquelle le bon sens se perd… » Abdessamad Dialmy4 
On 12 March 2000, to mark International Women’s Day, hundreds of 
thousands of men and women protested in the streets of the two main 
cities of Morocco5. In Rabat and Casablanca, men and women of all ages 
showed their support or their opposition to the Plan of Action for the 
Integration of Women in Development. The Plan of Action was 
formulated in the context of the Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and focused on 
the empowerment of women in education, health and development 
among other issues. 
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Already in the first half of the last century, the Moroccan reformist 
agenda highlighted the need to strengthen women’s role in society. In 
the 1950s, the first women’s political sections were created6. In the 
1960s, the Mudawana (the personal status code) was instated by the 
government of Morocco and was described as the “second most 
important action” of the newly independent government7. The 
codification of the law was meant to be modernist and worked as a 
strong nationalist symbol. It codified traditional Maliki jurisprudence and 
defined the regulations of marriage, inheritance or child custody among 
other issues. After many calls for reform, it was only in the 1990s, when 
women’s rights were linked to human rights, that the call for reform 
received new impetus.8 Women’s role and rights has proved to be a 
recurring source of tensions within Moroccan society. The monarchy has 
intervened repeatedly on this issue, giving the impression that it tries to 
impose itself as an arbiter between the different positions (relating to its 
dual role as head of state and Commander of the Faithful). The current 
laws can therefore be understood as an “imposed consensus”, and some 
might imply that there is no real commitment to implement these laws. 
The march in Casablanca, where some 200,000 people participated9 
was organized by two Islamist movements. Men and women marched in 
separate columns and were essentially protesting against the change of 
articles within the Mudawana. According to a prominent figure of 
Al Adl wal Ihsan (an important Moroccan Islamist movement), the 
purpose of the demonstration was to show that “Moroccan women 
reject the plans imposed by the West while the Sharia recognizes the 
rights of Muslim women and protects them”10. 
On the same day, in the capital, the crowds marching in support of 
the Plan of Action reached similar numbers. Instrumental in the 
organization of the march were leftist parties and several Human Rights 
organizations. They too, claimed their religious identity loudly and used 
the slogan: “we are all Muslims, and we all support the Plan”11. 
These events showed the enormous societal tensions along intra-
religious lines over the status and condition of women in Moroccan 
society. Both marches were held to support Women’s rights, but what is 
understood by “women’s rights” was very different for the two crowds. 
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3. The Methodology 
“We need to shift our mentality away from mediator as person to 
mediating as space […] And in that reference what it points toward is 
that you can have sets of people who connect to different parts but who 
collaborate, who can find this common space for the benefit of both their 
particular piece of it and the wider whole […]” John Paul Lederach12  
Research has confirmed that conflicts between worldviews are more 
difficult to solve than other conflicts. Isak Svensson uses quantitative 
methods within his research on the resolution of conflicts with religious 
dimensions13. He uses the concept of conflicts of religious identity when 
conflicts between parties are divided along religious lines, and the 
concept of religious incompatibility when the conflicts are about 
religious issues and political demands linked to them. Svensson shows 
how this type of conflict has increased over time and is less likely to end 
in negotiated settlement compared to other types of conflicts. The Safe 
Mediation Space can be used as a methodology to transform conflicts of 
religious incompatibility. 
The SMS methodology has been developed since 2004 within the 
FDFA and with its partners and is based on Jean-Nicolas Bitter’s 
qualitative research14. Bitter defines this methodology as a “process of 
meeting or confrontation of two discourses or two narratives seeking to 
coordinate their actions [...].”15 The direct objective of the SMS is to 
create “safe social spaces where parties can come together to discuss and 
develop practical joint projects for addressing aspects of the conflict 
[and this] is an approach of particular relevance to conflicts where 
parties hold different worldviews.”16 It is a place where the parties can 
feel safe and secure, particularly in the sense that their worldview will not 
be threatened or disrespected. 
One of the most significant differences between the SMS 
methodology and the commonly known phase model of mediation17 is 
its structure18. Whereas the commonly known phase model of mediation 
is structured along five or six phases, the SMS only uses two of them: 
the “preparation of the space” and “engagement in the space”. 
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3.1. Preparing the Safe Mediation Space 
In the first phase, the SMS is prepared, and the framework is set for the 
participants to participate safely in the dialogue process. The working 
hypothesis is tested, and relevant participants are identified. 
Participants: Within the SMS, parties or participants of the dialogue 
are understood as representatives of discourses of their communities and 
are “guardians, legitimate interpreters and shapers of the discourse of a 
community”19. This should not be confused with their institutional 
affiliation. The methodology relies on the assumption that having the 
right participants means first to have credible representatives of the 
different worldviews in the conflict and second, that they have the 
(moral) power to navigate within the narratives of their communities and 
to propose actions that will be acceptable to them. 
Common Vision: Establishing a basic common vision is one of the 
first steps in creating a Safe Mediation Space20. Its formulation can be 
very simple with the condition that all parties should agree to it. It can 
be useful to formulate it practically. Concepts that might mean different 
things to the different parties, such as “peace” or “justice” are to be 
avoided. The common vision is developed during the “preparation of 
the space” and the formulation needs to be tested with the different 
potential participants. 
“Safety lines”: For the participants to feel safe to join the space and 
to agree to the dialogue, it is essential to establish safety measures, so 
called “safety lines”. These “safety lines” represent an agreement among 
parties and organizers that enables them to join the dialogue. They are 
mostly formulated negatively and set limits to statements and behaviours 
that should be avoided. However, these “safety lines” are not imposed 
and need to be agreed upon by all participating parties. 
3.2. Engaging in the Safe Mediation Space 
“Because meaning (understood as the concrete effects of utterances) may 
be constructed differently, dialog towards problem-solving in mediation 
spaces should be constructed methodologically as ‘dialog through practice’ 
[…] The objective of this process is to produce projects providing pilot 
experiences that serve as blueprints for wider solutions required by the 
conflict context.” Jean-Nicolas Bitter21  
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The second phase, “engaging in the space” puts trust building and joint 
initiatives in the centre. As Flucher and Schneider describe it, “it is not 
the task of the mediators to approximate or change the interests and 
values of the parties. At the end of the mediation, the parties should be 
able to walk out of the "mediation room" with the same values they had 
before, but with a concrete solution to their conflict.”22 Similarly to the 
commonly known phase model of mediation, the content is not 
determined at the onset of the process, but is gradually generated as part 
of a creative, interactive process. “Due to the parties speaking from 
within different worldviews, it is often hard for the actors or third party 
to understand each other right away. Through the process, content and 
solutions are developed by each party in a different way, using the 
resources of their worldview.”23 By definition, a conflict of worldview 
happens at two levels: at the behavioural and at the value level. The SMS 
aims at a transformation on the behavioural level. This means that the 
participants should find a common ground in their actions 
(collaborations, joint initiatives), while the narratives that are behind 
these actions might stay contradictory. The rationale is that actions 
should not harm each other, even if the values and worldviews on which 
they are based are very different. 
4. The Safe Mediation Space Process 
4.1. Preparing the space 
The theory of change for the process was formulated as: “If actors 
interested in gender issues with different references come together with 
the will to look for ground where they can agree practically and develop 
a common discourse that is oriented towards practice, then they can work 
together for the betterment of women’s situation in Morocco”. A mixed 
convener team (co-facilitators) was set up, with representatives of CPI 
and the FDFA. CPI is a non-governmental organization based in 
Geneva that works on conflicts that involve Muslim political actors. It 
has a unique expertise in Islam and conflict transformation and a broad 
network among religious and political leaders in the Muslim world, 
particularly in North Africa. An independent researcher with affinities to 
the “Al Adl wal Ihsan” movement and expert on questions of the status 
of women within Islamic movements in North Africa acted as third co-
facilitator throughout the entire process. 
 Women and Religion in Morocco 
Page 11 
In the preparation phase, the objective of the three co-facilitators was 
to better understand the context of a possible dialogue and set its frame. 
With the help of the local researcher, a conflict analysis was carried out. 
During two visits, “pre-talks” with various parties helped to identify 
potential participants, to build trust between participants and third 
parties, and to address the fears of the participants. The co-facilitators 
spoke with over fifty interlocutors including journalists, researchers, 
opinion leaders and religious institutions. The discussions fostered 
understanding of the situation, refined the analysis, enabled testing of 
the hypothesis and explained the methodology to potential participants. 
Within the discussions, different formulations of a common vision that 
would work for all and “safety lines” were tested and set. This process 
made it possible for the “space” to happen. 
4.1.1. Tensions 
“So, conflicts between worlds, including conflicts between 
incommensurable worlds, which some decades ago mainly involved people 
living in separate territories, also involve today parties living in the same 
place.” Oscar Nudler24  
The process in Morocco was built on the hypothesis that the 
polarization between “secularists” and “Islamists” is an important 
obstacle to nonviolent and constructive dialogue on improving the 
situation of women in Morocco.25 The minimal consensus among the 
interlocutors was that the situation of women in Morocco needs to be 
improved in practice. 
On one hand, actors of different Islamist tendencies considered that 
the “real” problems of women related to schooling, health, housing, 
poverty, or socio-economic injustice. On the other hand, those related to 
secularist tendencies considered that the “real” problems of women were 
inheritance, abortion, polygamy, or the marriage of minors. The 
polarization is often exploited by the parties on different levelsi. Civil 
society parties who refer to international conventions have influence on 
the reforms and formulations of existing laws and codes. On the other 
hand, parties with strong religious influence have more influence in 
 
i An aspect repeatedly formulated by the interlocutors and that would need further research 
was the linkages of the discourses with financial and technical support either from Western or 
from Middle Eastern actors. 
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society and, since a member of the Parti de la justice et du développement 
(PJD) was appointed head of government in 2011, it also has influence 
on the implementation of these laws. 
4.1.2. Participants 
During two pre-visits, the co-facilitators met and discussed with actors 
representing different inspirations and references within Moroccan 
society. They met active civil society members in several areas: activists 
and members of associations involved in women's and family rights, in 
charity work, in couple mediation, or fighting for the rights of Amazigh 
women. They also met women's associations affiliated to Islamist 
movements, researchers, academics, journalists, religious leaders who 
worked outside the mainstream (such as Salafi Ulema) and those who 
were part of official religious institutions (the League of Ulema)26. The 
idea of dialogue elicited different reactions from the interlocutors: Some 
refused any dialogue; others said that they had never considered it but 
said were open to the idea. 
As criteria for participants, the co-facilitators chose men and women 
with strong and orthodox ideas (not moderate in their positions), but 
ready to engage in constructive dialogue, meaning that they were not 
only participating in order to debate. They had to be committed to the 
cause of “betterment of the condition of women” in one way or another. 
The participants were invited in a personal capacity (ad personam). This 
means that the participants were not talking from an institutional point 
of view, and not referring to each other as representatives of institutions. 
This allowed for more flexibility, enabling them to deviate from the 
positions of their communities and constituencies, and avoided 
institutional confrontations or party politics. 
At the end, the participants who committed to the process 
represented a wide spectrum of opinion: old and young, women and 
men, academics (e.g. professors in Islamic law or gender) religious 
discourse-shapers (e.g. an atheist and three Salafisi, including a woman 
 
i All movements within Salafism have claimed or were qualified as being reformists (for 
further information read Abbas Aroua, ‘The Salafiscape in the Wake of the “Arab Spring”’, 
Cordoba Research Papers (Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, 2014). Salafism advocates for a 
return to the Qur’anic texts and to “authentic Islam” with the endeavour to purify it from 
“heretical innovations”. The current emphasizes the rationality of Islamic thought. This also 
includes the reform of the governance and economic system of societies. In Morocco, this 
movement was instrumental in the society’s fight for independence (for further information read 
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wearing the niqab), members of political parties (leftist to nationalist and 
anarchist, active in the government or not), social movements (e.g. Al 
Adl wa Al Ihsan), advocacy groups (e.g. for women’s rights, for Amazigh 
rights), associations (e.g. engaged in family mediation, Islamic 
associations)i. Their positions towards the matter in question can be 
thought of along the lines of the following typological continuum: 
1) Of “French-style” secular (laicist) inspiration, with a framework 
relating exclusively to human rights and international conventions: 
Those for whom their actions for women's rights are independent of 
religion. 
2) Secular in inspiration referring mainly to human rights and 
international conventions, arguing that Islam has contributed to these 
international standards and that the purpose of Sharia law and these 
standards is similar: Those for whom their actions for women's rights 
are compatible with their religion. 
3) Of Islamic and reformist religious inspiration, relating to religious 
texts through the practice of ijtihad (“the effort of interpretation that a 
Muslim must undertake to give religious meaning and guidance to a new 
context”27) and the re-reading of texts from a female perspective. Some 
of these actors propose a “third way”: Those for whom women's rights 
and religion are intimately linked. 
 
Khalid Zekri, ‘Aux sources de la modernité marocaine’, Itinéraires. Littérature, textes, cultures, 
no. 2009). 
Salafi movements have been targeted especially after 9/11 and have been associated with 
violence and terrorism because Al Qaeda and Islamic State embrace the teachings of some Salafi 
writers. We tend to forget that there are many different kinds of Salafi groups and that 
Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia is not lived in the same way as Wahhabism in Indonesia. 
Assumptions that see all Salafis as inherently exclusivist, intolerant and violent are factually 
incorrect. History is full of examples from across all religious traditions of both violent and non-
violent movements for social change. For further reading also see: Inayah Rohmaniyah and Mark 
Woodward, ‘Wahhabi Perspectives on Pluralism and Gender: A Saudi – Indonesian Contrast’, 
Center for Strategic Communication. Arizona State University, 21 May 2012. See also: Abbas 
Aroua. Four Criteria for Differentiating Religious Entities. Cordoba Peace Institute – Geneva, 
2020. 
i The following “Islamist” tendencies participated: The Unification and Reform Movement 
(MUR), Al Adl wal Ihsan (AWI), Salafists, the Movement for the Nation and the Civilizational 
Alternative. On the side of the “Secularists”, the following trends participated: The Democratic 
Association for Women's Rights (ADFM), the Union for Women's Action (UAF), the 
Federation of the League for Women's Rights (FLDDF). 
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4) Of Islamist religious inspiration relating to religious texts with a 
certain ambivalence in its relationship to international conventions 
(“with reservations on certain points”). 
5) Of Islamist religious inspiration and with a reference system 
relating exclusively to religious texts in their literalist reading out of 
context. 
4.1.3. A common vision 
As common ground, all interlocutors had agreed that the conditions for 
women in Morocco need to be improved empirically (not talking about 
rights), even if they did not at all agree on what to change and how to 
change it. Asked how they would formulate the tensions, the actors 
referred to dichotomies such as modernist vs. conservative, using 
international vs. national reference, leftist vs. conservative, leftist vs. 
Islamist, secularist vs. Islamist, feminist vs. extremist, etc. After having 
tested different formulations of the common vision, it was decided to 
formulate the common vision as a process: “Actors with different 
inspirations and references come together with the will to look for 
ground where they can agree practically, and develop a common 
discourse or narrative that is oriented towards practice for the 
betterment of the condition of women”. 
4.1.4. “Safety lines” 
Three “safety lines” defined safety measures for the space, organizers 
and participants. This is in line with the reality that “Religions as ‘worlds’ 
or matrices of social construction of reality are intimately related to the 
security of the community that inhabits them”28. The safety measures 
protected the participants from what they perceived as verbal violence 
from “the other” and addressed profound fears that they had expressed 
during the pre-talks. The following three “safety lines” were defined: 
1) No statements against the state and the makhzen; 
2) No statements calling for disrespect of the laws in place; 
3) No statements attacking each other’s references (CEDAW, Islamic 
references, etc.) and no takfirism (excommunication). 
The first “safety line” was set to protect the presence of members of 
Al Adl wal Ihsan. The Association does not accept the monarchy as the 
Commander of the Faithful and is tolerated as a social movement but 
not as a political force. The second “safety line” protected the organizers 
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and the space itself, as the co-facilitators had been warned that official 
circles might not agree with the process. Finally, the third “safety line” 
was strongly voiced by some of the leftist participants, as some of them 
had experienced “takfir” in the past (i.e. excommunication, denunciation 
as a non-believer) and were profoundly hurt by what they felt as attacks 
on their personal integrity. 
Additionally, a few ground rules were defined to protect the space, 
such as the request not to take pictures. A few participants had 
expressed discomfort in being photographed with some of the other 
participants. This also related to what they said was their credibility 
towards their own constituency. Participants (and organizers) were asked 
not to divulge information in the media, including social media. Finally, 
the meetings were held under the Chatham House Rulei. These “safety 
lines” and ground rules were included in the invitation letters and 
repeated during the first meeting. 
4.2. Engaging in the Space 
4.2.1. Progress of the process 
Four dialogue rounds took place in 2016 and 2017. Methodologically, 
the content and agenda were gradually generated based on the 
continuous feedback and evaluation by the participants. Held in 
Casablanca, Rabat and Marrakesh, all four meetings were attended by 
12-15 participants and lasted 2-4 days. The first meeting focused on a 
good understanding of the methodology and ground rules of the SMS. It 
was an opportunity to present the general framework of the meeting, 
summarizing the two pre-visits and confirming the various observations 
and hypotheses. The organizers made clear that the objective of the 
dialogue was not to increase women’s rights (irrespective of the 
understanding of what they are) but to dismantle stereotypes and to 
increase relationship building and dialogue. They explained the criteria 
adopted for the selection of participants, the logic of the programme and 
the methodology chosen. 
 
i “When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are 
free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), 
nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.” ‘Chatham House Rule’, Chatham House, 
accessed 22 November 2018, https://www.chathamhouse.org//node/44. 
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In each dialogue round, participants were asked to discuss the latest 
political developments on the questions and to provide inputs prepared 
by the participants on different polarizing topics (“hot issues”). The 
differing positions on topics such as complementarity and equality, the 
relationship to the West and to the Middle East, the issue of identity, 
inheritance or individual freedoms became apparent and openly shared. 
One objective of these recurring discussions on “hot issues” was to have 
discussions on “content”, while another was to allow the participants to 
acknowledge each other’s positions. These substantive discussions made 
similarities and differences apparent and revealed clearly the different 
positions of participants with “secularist” and “Islamist” references, but 
it also opened the space for positive surprisesi. The atmosphere was 
mostly defined by mutual respect but did not lack tensions. 
After each dialogue round, extensive oral and written feedback was 
requested from the participants. Methodologically, it was crucial to 
transparently talk about the feedback provided by the participants. After 
the last dialogue round, the participants officially lifted the Chatham 
House rule and the request not to publicise the process on social 
networks.  
4.2.2. Outcome of the process 
The objectives of the process (to bring together actors of different 
references concerned with the women's issue in Morocco in order to 
reduce the obstacles due to the polarization between secularists and 
Islamists in Morocco and to identify and work on concrete initiatives in 
order to improve the status of women in Morocco) were partially 
achieved. The process also showed that the subject touched on 
questions as diverse as colonization, the relationship to the West and to 
the Middle East, the relationship to religion, political systems, definition 
of freedoms, trade unions, or the Mudawana. Whereas the process 
exceeded the hopes of the co-facilitators regarding the decreasing of 
stereotypes and improvement of the quality of relationships, the work on 
common initiatives was less successful than expected. 
 
i To a remark from a participant who pointed out that it had been the feminist movements 
that had liberated women in Morocco, a participant replied that reformist intellectuals (i.e. 
Salafist) had dealt with the liberation of women in Morocco long before, citing examples. To 
hear this from a Salafi was felt as a “pleasant surprise” by a women’s rights activist. 
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From a methodological point of view, the absence of an institutional 
framework for the participants and the freedom to speak in a protected 
space were key factors for the success of the meetings. Indeed, several 
participants attested that this was the first time they could speak directly 
and openly with the “other”, without worrying about the institutional 
policy they were supposed to adhere to. Some people expressed relief 
and enthusiasm for this new way of meeting. 
Regarding the sustainability of the process, it would be interesting to 
hear today, more than two years later, if contact among the participants 
is still continuing. During the meetings, the facilitators had asked how 
the mediation space affected the work of the participants outside the 
space and if there were any spill-over effects. One participant testified to 
the rejection of her (feminist) association to engage in dialogue with 
people “from the other side”. But she had acquired some tools and 
examples to show that dialogue was possible and that it was not accurate 
to judge “whole currents” (meaning the Salafis).  
A university professor pointed out that in her university environment 
such a project was considered utopian by her colleagues and that the fact 
of it happening was in itself a success. The idea to replicate this 
experience at the university level by creating a student club for dialogue 
between students and teachers from different backgrounds was shared as 
well. 
A Salafi described that within his constituency, the predominant 
perception of feminist movements was that of betrayal and alienation. 
Another Salafi added that his participation in the space had been 
severely criticized by his own community, as the people involved in this 
type of space were perceived as “traitors”. Both participants testified that 
after a while, they were able to partly deconstruct these prejudices and 
opinions. Thanks to this mediation space, they were able to cite concrete 
examples to their colleagues testifying to the inaccuracy of their 
perception. 
When connecting to the march of 12 March 2000, it is questionable 
whether the dialogue process would have made a difference. But the 
hope remains that the relationships built would have favoured a 
tempered tone by some of the actors. 
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5. Lessons Learnt 
5.1. Common language 
During the process, the organizers had invited several external resource 
persons. CPI gave training in conflict transformation and conducted a 
conflict analysis with the group. During the second meeting, two 
Tunisian women were invited by the organizersi to testify from their 
experience in the “Dialogue for Women”, a project implemented by 
Search for Common Ground.”29 A Sudanese faith based mediator based 
in the UK was invited to train the group in faith based family mediation 
during the third meeting30. Quite introductory in substance, both 
trainings and the Tunisian example were thought to establish a common 
language that could provide a basis for discussion. 
The trainings and cases discussed proved to be excellent 
methodological means to allow for discussions. It enabled the 
participants to have a common language on the issues, with formulations 
and terms that were defined together. This logic followed the 
methodological aspect of the SMS to “speak practically” and to “act 
together” (common training being understood as common action). The 
increasingly relaxed atmosphere of the dialogue rounds was partly due to 
the trainings and the exercises. 
The role plays in family mediation for example allowed for 
participants to discuss topics that were considered too sensitive in a 
normal discussion setting. Being in a role play (with sometimes funny 
moments such as a young Salafist playing the role of a mother with a lot 
of humour) allowed for discussing very sensitive issues in the context of 
the role play (e.g. freedom of religion). In a similar manner, the Tunisian 
experience allowed participants to discuss “how it is in Tunisia” and to 
project the discussion about polarizing issues of Morocco onto Tunisia. 
Our case showed that within SMS, trainings allowing for a common new 
 
i The purpose of presenting such an experience was not to make a comparison between two 
contexts that are certainly different. It was a “resource” presentation to stimulate reflection based 
on the experiences of others and help the reflection to go further. The two women represented 
an Islamist and a secular association respectively. For additional information on the project, a 
report and a video are available on the website of “Search for Common Ground”. The Tunisian 
dialogue among eighteen secular and Islamist Tunisian women's associations had resulted in the 
common drafting of a law on parity in decision-making positions in the public service. 
Unfortunately, due to a change in project strategy the Tunisian dialogue did not come to a result. 
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vocabulary and experiencing together practical speaking can be a central 
component for its success. 
5.2. Joint initiatives 
During the second dialogue round participants were given the 
opportunity to suggest ideas for concrete initiatives that would take place 
outside of the SMS. The co-facilitators encouraged the participants to 
seek ways to carry out the proposed activities by mobilizing the various 
networks to which they had access, paying attention to the inclusive 
aspect of the implementation of the project. The participants pledged to 
see each other within the predefined groups to work on the common 
initiatives agreed together. 
Before the third meeting, the participants had not met to work on 
concrete collaboration, which was a challenge. However, beyond the 
official meetings, some had met in a friendly atmosphere to break the 
fast during Ramadan, whereas others remained in contact via the groups 
established on WhatsApp. It was only after the third meeting that one 
common action took place. A group had organized a conference on “the 
ethics of public space and coexistence”. It seemed, however, to the co-
facilitators that the group was mainly of the “secularist” tendency, and 
Salafists were lacking completely at the event. 
The co-facilitators discussed the disappointments linked with this 
aspect of the process with the participants. They mentioned lack of time 
or resources as the main reason for not working on joint initiatives 
outside of the space. For mediators of a SMS two lessons can be drawn: 
(financial) resources need to be attributed by the organizers for such 
joint initiatives, and external convening by third parties or inside 
mediators is also crucial for the joint initiatives at this stage of the SMS. 
5.3. Interests and positions  
During the first dialogue round, a short theatre scene was presented by 
two co-facilitators representing the various prejudices and tensions 
identified during the two pre-visit missions from an external perspective. 
The participants were then asked to work in groups and to identify the 
interests and positions that could be identified from the scene. 
The exercise following the theatre scene showed how difficult it was 
to distinguish between positions and interests. Retrospectively, the use 
of the distinction of “positions” and “interests” in the exercise was a 
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methodological error. The differentiation of positions and interests used 
in classical mediation is not applicable in conflicts with a so-called 
religious incompatibility without adaptations. Within classical mediation, 
interests and values are openly presented in their diversity. This is 
supposed to facilitate the development of a consensus between the 
parties.31 This assumption does not apply to worldview conflicts as 
values themselves might be rooted in different worldviews (e.g. 
democracy vs. shurai or the status of international conventions). Digging 
into interests or values brought tensions regarding their differences and 
incompatibilities. Worldview differences created ambiguities. This 
became very visible during the theatre exercise, where the questions on 
interests became intrinsically linked with the core references of the 
participants: international human rights vs. religious interpretation of the 
concept of “women’s rights”. Within worldview conflicts, mediators 
might need to refrain from this substantial step of classical mediation.  
5.4. Relationship building  
During the whole process, a special focus was also placed on group 
work and team building in order to improve the relationship level among 
the participants, in line with Lederach: “A key to constructive social 
change lies in that which makes social fabric, relationships, and relational 
spaces”32. Except for the first meeting, the organizers chose meeting 
rooms in hotels, and asked participants to stay on-site for the entire 
period of the meeting. Following the advice of the local consultants, the 
organizers paid special attention to the tea breaks and the setup of the 
meals. 
Each dialogue round enabled the participants to become increasingly 
familiar with each other and with their respective positions. Some of the 
participants were widely known by others through the media, and the 
process enabled them to interact on a personal level. Speaking “without 
an institutional hat” enabled flexibility in their exchanges. The 
evaluations showed a growing decrease in stereotypes. This is also true 
for the co-facilitators who needed to reflect on their own prejudice that 
“secularists are more willing to talk”. 
 
i The question of the frame of reference sparked a debate among the participants when one 
speaker pointed out that the Moroccan Constitution affirmed the superiority of the Islamic frame 
of reference. This interpretation of the Constitution was not shared by other speakers who saw 
that the Moroccan Constitution confirmed the superiority of international conventions over 
national standards. 
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At one point, both written and oral evaluations focused heavily on 
the behaviours of some participants who were considered disrespectful 
or provocative (mocking or destructive criticism). The organizers 
considered these complaints and addressed them openly, which was 
greatly appreciated by the ones who had felt hurt. 
An example cited repeatedly in the participants' evaluations was a 
change in attitude towards the woman wearing the full veil: “I never 
imagined that I would one day put myself at the same table with a 
woman wearing the niqab and discuss with her […] From now on, I 
know I can do it.” Or: “Before, seeing a woman wearing a niqab 
provoked me, but today […] I talk to her and I am ready to work with 
her”. One secularist participant pointed out that this was the first time 
she had communicated with Islamists by telephone and via WhatsApp. 
Others found that they had “more respect for the other's opinion”, that 
they had “learned a lot from others, especially with regard to 
commitment and the willingness to move forward together”. 
5.5. Identities of the Co-Facilitators 
The reputation of Switzerland as a neutral actor was key to the process. 
The positive image of Switzerland is partly due to its lacking a colonial 
past or military expansionism. The openness of the FDFA to work with 
non-violent extremists or orthodox groups has been a comparative 
advantage in regard to its credibility in engaging with religiously inspired 
political actors such as Salafists33. 
The institutional partnership of the organizers enabled a dual identity 
of the co-facilitators and both institutions worked as “insider 
mediators”. Initially, the FDFA was trusted among the Associations for 
women’s rights (the embassy financially supported projects of women’s 
rights groups), and CPI was trusted by Islamists. With time, the group’s 
trust towards both institutions had grown. 
An “external intervention” was considered necessary by the 
participants in the current context, even if sometimes with some 
frustration. Many participants called for a continuation of the process 
through their recommendations. The neutrality of the institutions that 
organised this process was considered by the participants in their 
evaluation as a point of strength. The identity of the co-facilitators, three 
women under 50, one of them with a headscarf, was assessed as well 
balanced in reference to the worldviews. However, this neutrality was 
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not a given. All three co-facilitators had felt the imperative to stay 
neutral to be challenging at some point or other. The process also 
opened up questions on the role of the foreign policy of Switzerland. 
Using the SMS, the approach was to support local conflict 
transformation processes, motivated by the Constitution’s explicit 
request to work on “the peaceful coexistence of peoples”; however, the 
Constitution also aims to promote human rights and the equal rights of 
men and women. A mediator is not supposed to take a position in a 
conflict, but Switzerland’s foreign policy is clearly on the side of the 
“secularists”. How to deal with this dual mandate remains an open 
question for the future of this kind of peace promotion initiative. 
6. Conclusion 
The Safe Mediation Space was conducted in Morocco by the FDFA and 
CPI with a wide variety of actors, from leftist human rights activists to 
niqab-wearing Salafists around the issue of the Women’s status and 
condition, aiming to reduce the polarization between secularists and 
Islamists in order to improve the situation of women in the country. 
This paper presented the two phases of the SMS: preparing the space 
and engaging in the space. The theoretical requirements of the SMS were 
defined, and the paper showed how the dialogue process had put the 
theory into practice – the following questions were dealt with in depth: 
How were the participants identified? Which formulations were found to 
harness all forces (e.g. common vision)? How were the (partly 
existential) fears of the potential participants considered (safety lines)? 
Theoretical reflections and lessons for the Safe Mediation Space can be 
drawn from the dialogue process: 1) Training units as an inherent part of 
the dialogue were of particular importance for the development of a 
common vocabulary; 2) The implementation of concrete initiatives 
outside the SMS need to be intentionally addressed by the organizers; 
3) The distinction between interests and positions can lead to 
ambiguities in conflicts with worldview differences; 4) SMS has great 
potential in creating new and restoring broken relationships; and 5) The 
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